EXE'nTION CLAUSE OF THE BA1NURUPT LAW.

perty which in any other state could not exist; and these were
not like contracts that were entered into in one state which would
be good everywhere, because these could have no force or effect
out of the state, could not be enforced in any other place. And
yet the Supreme Court of the United States held that the recognition of the state liens by that bankrupt law did not render it liable
to the objection of want of uniformity in the constitutional sense.
(See Peck v. Jenndss, 7 Howard 612.-ED. Am. LAw REG.)
I do not desire to enter into any extended discussion. Enough
*has been said by other senators in relation to this question, so
it is understood in all its bearings ; and it seems to me that it is
entirely -clear that the adoption of these different homestead
exemptions of the different states does not prevent the law from
being uniform in a legal sense. I might say that when the bankrupt law of 1841 was under discussion in Congress, an amendment was adopted in the House by a very considerable majority,
embodying the very provision that is contained in this bill, and
that amendment was moved by a member of Congress who is now
one of"the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Eventually that amendment wvas struck out by a small majority,
but it was at one time adopted, and adopted upon the motion of a
gentleman who is now one of the judges of the Supreme Court
of the United States.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OR MAINE."
SUPREME COURT

F MASSACHUSETTS.'

SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.3
SUPREME COURT OF

EW YORK.1

SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.

5

ACCOUNT STATED.

The plaintiff claimed to have left a draft with a bank, for collection,
I From W. W. Virgin, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 54 Me. Rer.
S From Hon. Charles Allen, Reporter; to appear in Vol. la of his Reports.

3 From Hon. T. M. Cooley; to appear in 16 Afich. Rep..
' From Hon. 0. L. Barbour; to appear in Vol. 48 of his Reports.
5 From W. G. Veazey, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 39 Vt. Reports.
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on the 24th of July 1856. His bank-book was written up as early as
Au!ust or September 1856, and balances were struck and the vouchers
delivered up to him repeatedly, afterwardsi until 1859, when he drew
out of the bank the balance remaining to his credit. In September
1856 he knew, or with reasonable attention might have known, that the
draft was not credited to him on the books of the bank; yet he omitted
to bring the matter to the notice of the bank until the spring of 1862.
Reld, that this was a stated account not objected to within a reasonable
time; so clearly so that it was not, under the evidence, a question proper
for the consideration of the jury, whether -the delay was sufficiently
accounted for: Hutchinson v. The Market Bank of Troy, 48 Barb
Beld also, that the judge properly refused to charge that under the
circumstances the plaintiff was absolutely and conclusively bound by the
stated account, and could, not recover of the bank the amount of the
draft. The true rule in such cases is that the stated account-is conclusive upon the parties, unless the plaintiff is able to impeach it by showing, affirmatively, fraud or mistake: Id.
AcTIoN.

For levying Illegal Taxes.-As the statute directs the supervisor to
levy upon the township the taxes which are specified in the certificate
made to him by the township clerk, he cannot be made liable in trespass
for so doing, even though some of the items are illegal, provided the
certificate does not show the illegality: Wall v. Trumbull and Smith v.
Crittenden, 16 Mich.
. For allowing Illegal Demands.--A member of the township board is
not liable in trespass to one who is taxed to pay an illegal demand which
has been allowed by the board, where they had jurisdiction to pass upo'the demand and only erred in judgment. Jurisdiction or ordinary demands is obtained by their mere presentment; and where cae claim's.are
of a class which are only referred to the board by a spepiui statute and
vote, the presentation of a claim, as one of the class covered by the
statute and vote is sufficient to call into exercise the jiaicial functions
of the board to determine whether it-is so in fact. And in passing upon
this question" the members are entitled to the same imrLnity as judges
of courts: Wall v. -Trumbull, 16 Mich.
The faes that the board allowed the demand without 9roof under oath,
on the dral statement of one, of its members, who was amiliar with the
facts, and that the claimant was not present in person, do not invalidate
the allowance. There is no impropriety in claims beiag handed in advance to a member of the board for presentation, o" in the members
acting upon their own knowledge without other proof: Id.
AGENT.

Anthority of a Pactor to act without lnstructions.-Inunforeseen circumstances of necessity or great urgency, a factor has an implied authority to act for his principal, irrespective.of his instructions or the ordiniry
usages of trade, in adjusting contracts and claims and disposing of property; and a factor who has so acted, in good .faith and with 'a sound
discretion, under the circumstances as they then appeared, will not be

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

185

liale for the consequences, although it turns out that his course was
disadvantageous to his principal : Greenleaf v. Moody, 13 Allen.
The owner of hay ii Maine consigned it to New Orleans to be sold,
during the rebellion. The military authorities of the United States
bought a portion, agreeing to pay for it in cash, and seized the remainder;
and afterwards refused to pay for any of it except in government certificates of indebtedness, bearing interest, to be taken at par. The consignees, acting in good faith and according to their best judgment and
the usual custom of factors at New Orleans at that time, but without
notice to the owner, accepted these certificates of indebtedness, and
shortly afterwards sold the same at ninety-three cents on the dollar,
which was then their market value there.. The owner was inorant of
this custom. Held, that the factors were not liable to the owner for the
discount of seven per cent. made in selling the certificates of indebtedneis": Pd.
ARBITRATION AND AwArD.
Uncertainty - iutuality -'Finality - Submission- Parinership.When one article of an award is, in itself, so complete and independent
of the rest of the award, that its separate enforcement would work no
injustice, a party may declare and recover up6n it, even though the other
portions of the award are void: Lamphire v. Cowan, 39 Vt.
If the decision is certain, uncertainty in the reasoning which led to
io will not invalidate the award: Id.
An ahvard between partners, relating to the disposition of partnership
debts and assets, may be certain. though their amounts are not stated,
if without such statement they are sufficiently identified: t. "
An award that one party shall pay a stranger a debt for which both
parties are bound, is valid as between the parties to the award: Id.
An award need not always provide a method of enforcement. -It is
often impossible, when partnership assets and debts are apportioned.
Sugh' an award may be valid between the partners, though it does not*
and cannot affect the riglts of the creditors or debtors of the partnership: Id.
If by manifest implication that appear, which) if positively expressed,
would render the award gooa, that is sufficient to support it : Id.
(When an obligation is so thrown upon one party as to be but a portion of the consideration for the award in his favor against the other
party, the performance of that obligation, if not provided for by the
award,.may be treated, without injustice, as a conditioin precedent to his
recovery on the award, so that on -proof of its performance he ought to
recover.)-STEELE, J.: Id.
An award which settles a partnership and 'divides its assets and liabilities as between the partners, and establishes their rights and duties
toward each other, is mutual and final: Id.
The submission embraced "all matters of difference." It must be
presumed in absence of evidence to the contrary, that all matters passed
upon by the arbitrators were matters of difference, and that all matters
of difference were passed upon: Id.
BAILMENT.

Distinguishedfrom Sace.-A receipt by which A. acknowledges to
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have received of B. a sewing-machine, to be returned in three months,
with condition added that if A. pays B. $60 within the three months,
the receipt shall be void, and B. shall execute a bill of sale of the
machine, creates a bailment only, and if A. sells the machine to a third
person, B. may immediately replevy it, though the three months have
not expired: Dunlap v. Gleason, 16 Mich.
BILLS AND NOTES.

Blank Indorsement by seeral-ParolEvidence as to Special Arrangemeat between Parties.-A blank indorsement of a negotiable promissory
note is, as between the immediate parties theieto, only prima faicie evidence of the contract implied by law; and it is competent to prove by
parol evidence, the agreement which was in fact made at the time of the
indorsement: Smith v. Morrill, 54 Me.
As to third persons without notice of any, other contract, the one
implied by law is conclusive: Id.
In an action by one indorser who had paid the note, against another
for contribution, it is competent for the*plaintiff to prove that it was
"verbally agreed by all the indorsers, previous to indorsing, that their
indorsements should be joint and not several; and that, in the event
of liability thereon, and the payment thereof by either, of the whole
amount of the note, each should pay to the one thus paying,, his equal
proportibn of the amount thus paid, as joint and not as several indorsers :"
Id.
Proof of such agreement would make the indorsers, as between themselves, co-sureties, and payment of the whole debt by one, would authorize the maintenance of suits by the one.so paying, -against each of the
others for their proportional parts, upon counts for money paid for their
use: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Legislative Allowance of Private Claims.-The constitutional provision that the legislature shall not audit and allow any private claim,
extends to claims against- townships and counties as well as those against
the state. Held, therefore, that a legislative act declaring a note given
by individuals for bounty moneys to be a lawful charge.against the
township, and directing the supervisor to levy a tax for its payment, was
inoperative: People v. Shennan, 16 Mich.
COUNT ER CLAIM.

A counter claim or defence of an equitable nature, may be interposed,
although the claim or demand mentioned in the complaint is purely of a
common law nature, or for the recovery of money only: The Hlicksuille,
&c., Railroad Co. v. The Long Island Railroad Co.,. 48 Barb.
If the claim and coirater claim arose out of the same transaction qi
contract, there is no necessity for a cross-action by the defendant: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Fraudulent Conveyance to Debtor's Wife-Deposition of Wife.-In a
suit in equity by a creditor against his debtdr and the debtor's wife,
seeking to reach and apply in payment of th'e debt property of the
debtor fraudulently conveyed to her with intent to defraud his creditors
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idso held by her that it cannot be come'at to be attached cr taken on
.cecution in a suit at law against the debtor, the court will not restrain
the plaintiff from taking the deposition of the debtor's wife, touching
the matters alleged in the bill against her, after the process has been
duly served upon her, although no service has been made upun her husband, and he is out of the country, and the plaintiff has not established
his debt against her husband by any judgment: Crom_pton v. Anthony,
13 Allen.
DECEDENTS' ESTATE.

Ancillary Administration in another State-Concdusiveness of Decree
in another State.-If ancillary administration is taken out in another
6tate upon the estate there of a deceased citizen of Massachusetts, a
decree of the judge of proibate there, allowing a claim of the administrator against the estate, and finding a balance due to him over and above
the assets there coming to his hands,.is not conclusive here, and will not
entitle the administrator to charge for such balance here: Ela v. Edwards, 13 Allen.
DEED.

Reforming.-The defendant agreed to sell and convey to the plaintiffs
a lot of land 26 feet 6 inches in width, being in depth on 0. street 120
feet, "1to and including the stable on the rear of the. premises." The
defendant executed and delivered a deed for the lot, describing it as
120 feet in depth, but making no mention of the stable. There was a
stable on the rear of the premises, built by a former owner, situated
partly upon the said lot, but 11 feet and 10 inches thereof were located
on the rear of another lot belonging to the defendant. Both parties
acted in the erroneous belief that the 120 feet.so conveyed included
the stable, and neither knew that any portion of it was located upon
another lot. Jeld, that this was not a case for the equitable interposition of the court to reform the deed, so as to make it conform, as to the.
dimensions of the premises, to the previous agreement b~tween the
parties: White v. Williams, 48 Barb.
A court of equity never grants that relief except when the mistake is
very plain, and operates contrary to the intention of the parties. Per
CLERKE, J.: Id.
EVIDENCE.
Estoppel-Attorney- Deposition of Deceased.Witness.-A party is not.
estopped from explaining how he understood the oath he took on-signing
a bill in chancery which is afterwards read in evidence against him:'
Whitcher v. Morey, 39 Vt.
It appearing that a law partner of the master who took a deposition,
acted, at the taking, as counsel on behalf of one of the parties, the
court will not, in absence of proof, presume that their partnership extended to matters of this nature: Rd.
Testimony given on a former trial by a witness, since deceased,. may
ne reproduced from minutes which were then taken, and whic-h are
proven to have been "full and taken with substantial correctness :"
Id
If the original minutes are shown to be lost, a copy of them, proven
tcbe a correct trmscript, may be read: Id.
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It is not important that the person who swears to the minutes should
profess to testify from recollection of the testimony, or be able to so
refresh his memory by reading the minutes as to recall the testimony tc
his mind. If he can swear that his minutes of the evidence given by
the deceased witness are fall and substantially correct, they may be read
to the jury: Id.
The party proposed to read to the jury as evidence a copy taken by
another person of the judge's notes, of the testimony of one 0., as given
upon a former trial, C. having deceased; and, at the same time, proposed
to prove that the original minutes were lost and the copy was correct,
and by the deposition of the judge that the original minutes were full
and taken with substantial correctness. .eid, that upon the proof offered
the party was entitled to read the copy to the jury: Id.
Of Party against Representative of Deceased Party.-The statute
which makes a party to civil proceedings a witness generally, except that
where the opposite party is representative of a deceased person, h shall
not testify to facts which must have been equally within the- knowledge
of the deceased, does not make the competency to testify depend upon
the relative degree of knowledge of the deceased and the witgess, but
is meant to altogether exclude the evidence where the deceased, if living,
zould have spoken to the same transaction: Kimball v. Kimball, 16
Mich.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

Deed-License- erbal" ontract to con vey Land.-A verbal contract
for the purctfase and future conveyance of real estate, followed by a
payment and securing of the price as agreed is not of itself sufficient to
authorize or license the proposed purchaser to enter upon the land, even
after the time has elapsed within which the owner of the land was to
give his deed: Wlitcer, Adm'r., v. Morey, 39 Vt.
A verbal contract for the future conveyance of land, though folldwed
by payment of the purchase-money, is, until the deed is given, inoperative
to pass any interest, legal or equitable, in the land or right to enter upon
it, and, unconnected with other facts, is not even evidence of a permission to enter upon the land : Id.
C. bargaind verbally with M. for a lot of woodland, C.- to deliver
part of the. purchase-money, and his notes and a mortgage for the rest
to a third person at a specified time, apd M. to leave a deed with the
same person to be taken by 0. at the same time. C. paid and delivered
his notes and a mortgage according to agreement. M. left no deed for
C., and ultimately refused to convey. The jury finding that M. gave C.
no permission to enter upon the land, and he having entered and peeled
bark, it is held, that the above facts were no warrant to C. to enter upon.
the land, and the bark he peeled was M.'s property and could not ba
held by the plaintiff who bought it of C. : .d.
Slide of Goods-Memorandum in Writing-Signature by.Stamping.
-The acceptance in Massachusetts of a bill of goods which are in a
warehouse in New York, with an order on the warehouseman for their
delivery without notice to him, is not an acceptance or receipt of the
goods, which will take the sale out of the operation of the Statute of
Frauds: Boardman v. Spooner, 13 Allen.
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If on the trial of an action to recover the price of goods sold and
delivered the purchaser produces, on notice, the vendor's bill of sile of
the goods, bearing the purchaser's name stamped thereon with a press,
and there is no evidence to show when or under what circumstinces it
was so stamped, this is not sufficient proof to authorize the jury to find
a note or memorandum in writing of the bargain, made and signed by
the purchaser: Pd.
If by the terms of an oral contract goods sold are subject to the purchaser's approval, a broker's note in writing of the sale which omits that
portion of the oral contract is inadmissible to take the case out of the
Statute of Frauds; nor, in such case, can the vendor be allowed to prove
that by a usage of trade the goods are to be examined within a limited
time, and if not examined and objected to within that time the sale is
deemed complete: Rd.
HUSBAND

AND WIFE.

lDiuorce for Cause existing at Marriage.-The statute allowing a
divorce on behalf of the wife, where the husband has become an habitual
drunkard, will not warrant a decree where the husband, to the knowledge of the wife, was a drunkard at the time of the marriage, and his
habits have not materially changed since: Porrettv. Poi-rett, 16 Mich.
INNKEEPER.

lntoxicating L uor.-An innkeeper has the same rights and privileges, so far as his o*n family or household is concerned, to furnish them
with such food and beverage as he judges fit and proper for their sustenance and refreshment, as any other head of a family,'and incurs
no penalty thereby, nor by having it in his house'when he so furnishes
it: State v. Jones, 39 Vt.
The responddxit was a hotel-keeper, and W. was employed by him four
days as a hostler. While. so. employed the respondent furnished him at
the bar with whiskey three times, which he .there drank. .W:took care
of the stables and was up nights, and had been so sitting up on these
three occasions when he so drank. Held, that -this furnishing to W.
did not come within the prohibited and penal provisions of the statute:
rd.
But the gratuitous furnishing of liquor to musicians, on the occasion
of dances at his house, though hired by himself, came within the statute:
Id.
JOINT DEBTORS.

S'parate Discharge.-Underthe statute of New York which :authorizes one of several joint debtors to make a separate settlement with the
creditors, which shall not discharge the others except for his proportion
of the debt, it is not necessary that the receipt given by the debtor thus
settling should refer to the statute, where it sufficiently appears on it2
face to be given under it: Holdredge v. Farmers'and Mechanics' Bank,
16 Mich.
Statute of Limitations-Paymentby One.-Where one partner after
the dissolution of the partnership gave a writing to the creditors, agree.
ing that they might compromise with and discharge the other, and he
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would still remain liable, and the creditors took compromise notes fron,
the other partner which were afterwards paid, held, that such payments
must be considered as made only on behalf of the party making them,
and could not have the effect to prevent action being barred by the
statute as to the other: Sigler v. Platt, 16 Mich.
LIBEL.

Complait-Innuendo.--Where the words used in an alleged libel,
ex necessitate, expose the plaintiff to public ridicule or reproach, no explanation or application of the language emiployed is required; but
where they are at all susceptible of an innocent construction, a complaint
alleging that the publication tends to blacken and injure the reputation
of the plaintiff and expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule,
cannot be sustained without'an innuendo explanatory of the ambiguous
words: More v. Bennett, 48 Barb.
A charge that a prostitute is under the patronageorprotection-of the
plaintiff does not necessarily impute moral guilt; and where, in a complaint upon such a charge, there was no allegation that the writer of the
alleged libel in.tended to impute such guilt to the plaintiff; it was held,
that the complaint was fatally defective in not containing an inhuendo:
Id.
Where the words are so ambiguous that they may be understood in an
innocent sense, the mere allegation of malicious intention is not suffi,
Vient: Id.
UiN DAMUS.
Return sufficient in Law bit false in Fact- When Court will issue
Peremptory Writ.-In this state, if, to an"alternative writ of 'Mandamus,
the res.pondents return a legally sufficient cause, though false in fact, the
court will decline to proceed further: Dane v. Derby et a'., 54 Me.
If the return be falsified in an action on the case, or by criminal
information for a false return, the court will then issue a peremptory
writ: Id.
.Neither the statute of 9 Ann., c. 20, nor any similar statute, has ever
been adopted in this state: id.
The respondent cannot demur to the petition and the writ; but, if the
writ be defective or do not contain allegations of all such facts as are
necessary to show that the prosecutor is legally entitled to the relief
prayed for,-it may be quashed on motion, or the defects may be taken
advantage of in the return : Id..
If the original return be sufficient, the filing of an additional one, in
the nature of a demurrer, will not affect the sufficiency of the former:
Id.
The writ must be executed in the form in which it has been issued,
or not at all: d.
The granting of a writ of mandamus is a matter of discretion, and
not of right: Id.
The court will not grant a peremptory writ against municipa officers
elected for one year bnly, ordering a new election, becausA of the
fraudulent voting practised at the election at -which they were -eclared
to be elected, if sut-h officers have returned a sufficient caus. to the
alternative writ: Id.
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.'jary resulting in Death.-The husband at the common law may
maintain an action against one through whose wrongful act an injury is
occasioned to the wife, notwithstanding death results before suit brought.
But he can only recover the pecuniary damage to himself, in consequence
of the injury, up to the time of the death. His anxiety and mental
anguish, occasioned by the injury, do not Constitute a basis for rhe recovery of damages: Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich.
RAILROAD COMPANIES.

Restricting Liability
1 as Carriers.-A railroad company chartered as
common carriers have no right to refuse to receive and carry goods
except upon a restricted liability, but every one has a right to require
his goods to be carried unter the common law obligations: Mc2lillan v.
The M. S. and N. I Railroad Co., 16 Mich.
The statute which forbids railroad companies restricting their common
law liability as carriers, does not prevent persons transacting business
with them from making such contracts as they .please by which they
relieve the company from some portion of their liabilities: Id.
And where a bill of lading is accepted without objection, and property
sent under it, with condition exempting the carrier from responsibility
for loss by fire, the -condition 'must be presumed to have been assented
to by the party for sufficient consideration, and proof that he did not
read it is immatbrial: I'd.
Bill of Lading- What it co'ers.-A bill of lading given at Cincinnati,
by which a railroad company promises to deliver goods "at Toledo for
Detroit'-the consignee doing business at Detroit-will cover the transportation to Toledo only, and another company receiving the goods at
Toledo to transport to Detroit, will receive and carry them under their
common law liability, and not under the conditions of the bill of lading:
Td.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

Where Vendor cadinot make complete Title:-After a contract had been
made for the conveyance of a parcel of land, itwas discovered that the
vendor's deed conveyed to him ar undivided two-thirds only. The
vendee was willing to take that and pay rateably, but the vendor refused
to convey. Held, that the vendee was entitled to specific performance
to the extent of the two-thirds: Condl v. Moseley, 16 Mich.
But held further, that it was error to order the vendee to deliver up
possession of the whole land, and to charge him with tent for the whole
from the time performance should have been made. The order in these
respects should have been no broader than the decree for perforxiiance':
Id.
TRADE-MARKS.

Injunction.-Where the defendant has procured a trade-mark closely
resembling ona already in use by the plaintifr and has attached it to a
perfume manufactured by him, adopting the same name and style of
packages as the latter, with the intention of counterfeiting the plaintiff's
trade-mark, as well as imitating the article and style of packages used
by him, and of appropriating, through such counterfeit label, the market

